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ABSTRACT 
Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared 
financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting 
BY 
ZHEN ZHANG 
November 30, 2015 
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 Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov (Co-Chair) 
 
Major Academic Unit: Accounting 
 
Participative budgeting plays an important role for information communication among 
hierarchies in organizations. In this study, I use a lab experiment to examine three research 
questions and investigate the role of supervisors in influencing subordinate honesty. First, I 
predict and find support that supervisory behavioral integrity, i.e. the alignment between a 
superior’s communication of a value of honesty and the superior’s behavioral honesty, is an 
effective informal control mechanism to influence employee honesty. However, the effectiveness 
of supervisory behavioral integrity in influencing employee honesty depends on the presence of 
shared financial interests between the superior and the subordinates, such that high supervisory 
behavioral integrity may promote employee honesty only in the presence of shared financial 
interests. In the absence of shared financial interests, supervisory behavioral integrity is no 
longer effective in influencing employee honesty. Finally, I investigate whether supervisory 
behavioral integrity, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, has incremental effect on 
subordinate honesty. The results suggest that, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, 
supervisory behavioral integrity has a stronger influence on subordinate honesty. Furthermore, 
high supervisory behavioral honesty is shown to have a demotion effect on subordinate honesty, 
i.e. subordinate honesty is lower when superior’s honesty is high than when it is low. 
Supplemental analysis provides potential explanations for the demotion effect. The implications 
of the findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
Participative budgeting plays an important role in organizations for information 
communication among hierarchies. Typically, lower-level managers and employees have private 
information regarding their local environments, such as their resource usage and productive 
capabilities (Covaleski et al. 2003). In the process of participative budgeting, upper managers 
obtain such information from the subordinates and use the information to make decisions related 
to planning, resource allocation, performance evaluation and compensation (Evans et al. 2001; 
Church et al. 2012). However, since the budget may determine resource allocations or 
performance targets, the subordinates may behave opportunistically and strategically 
misrepresent their private information to serve their own interests.  
To regulate employee behavior, management accounting researchers have traditionally 
focused on the use of formal controls. They have explored effective budgetary control 
mechanisms such as contract designs (Evans et al. 2001, Chow et al. 1988, Chow et al. 1991), 
budget auditing and monitoring (Webb 2002), information asymmetry controls (Fisher et al. 
2002; Stevens 2002; Hannan et al. 2006), etc. However, formal control mechanisms are often 
costly for the firms (Baker et al. 1988). They sometimes increase employee stress and 
dissatisfaction (Kramer 1999) and reduce their trust in the employer and their willingness to 
cooperate (McAllister 1995; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002). Recently, a growing body of 
management accounting literature examines the role of informal control mechanisms in affecting 
employee behavior (Kachelmeier et al. 1994; Rankin et al. 2008; Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 
2010; Krishnan et al. 2012; Church et al. 2012; Newman 2014). Informal controls direct 
employee behavior through implicit factors such as social norms or values (Cardinal et al. 2004; 
Sitkin et al. 2010). In an organization, employees usually view their supervisors as bearers of the 
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organization’s values (Arnett and Fritz 2003), and supervisors may become the social models to 
influence employees’ behavioral (Wimbush 1999; Simons 2002). In this study, I examine three 
research questions to investigate how supervisors may influence subordinate honesty in budget 
reporting in an organization.  
First, I investigate whether a supervisor’s behavioral integrity may promote subordinate 
honesty in budget reporting. Supervisory behavioral integrity refers to the alignment between 
espoused values, i.e. the values expressed by a superior’s words1, and enacted values expressed 
by the superior’s deeds in an organization (Simons 2002; Palanski and Yammarino 2009; Tang 
and Liu 2012 etc.). Managers are usually responsible to communicate the ethical norms of the 
organization to their employees (Wimbush 1999; Dewane 2007); in the meanwhile, their 
behavior and decisions may not always comply with these ethical norms. The findings from a 
survey study show that more than 20% of American workers view their senior managers as 
failing to act in alignment with their words (Bates 2002). Simons’ (2002) concept of behavioral 
integrity itself does not necessitate the espoused values to be ethical. However, because it is 
common for managers to espouse ethical and socially accepted values, it lacks practical 
implications to study unethical espoused values (Fritz et al. 2013; Prottas 2013). Accordingly, in 
this study, I investigate only the situation where the superior communicates an ethical value to 
the subordinates. Specifically, I investigate supervisory behavioral integrity as the alignment 
between a supervisor’s communication of an honesty value and the supervisor’s behavioral 
honesty. That is, I rely on Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation to argue that 
supervisory behavioral integrity provides the environmental cues for subordinates to observe and 
vicariously learn about the honesty norms in the organization, and influences the degree to which 
                                                          
1 Simons (2002) gives examples of espoused values in an organization, such as mission statements, corporate value 
statements, descriptions of individual values, priorities, etc. 
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the subordinates follow such norms. Thus, I predict that the subordinates will be more honest in 
budget reporting when supervisory behavioral integrity is high than when it is low. The first 
research question establishes the main effect of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate 
honesty, which serves as the “baseline” to study the other two research questions.  
Second, I investigate whether the effect in the first research question may depend on the 
organizational environments. Specifically, I investigate whether and how the presence of shared 
financial interests between the superior and the subordinates moderates the effect of supervisory 
behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty in budget reporting. The construct of shared financial 
interests refers to the situation where the subordinates are financially impacted by the superior’s 
behavior. Formal control mechanisms across organizations may determine whether the 
subordinates share financial interests resulting from the superior’s behavior. For example, under 
a group-based pay plan2, a superior’s behavior may impact the outcome of the group, and 
accordingly, impact the benefits that each employee in the group receives. I argue that the 
presence of shared financial interests between the subordinates and the superior influence the 
psychological distance the subordinates feel from the superior, such that the subordinates feel 
psychologically closer to the superior when they are financially impacted by the superior’s 
behavior than when they are not impacted. As an individual feels psychologically closer to 
another person, he or she is more likely to carry over attributes inferred from the other person, 
and thus to behave in the same way as the other person. Therefore, the effect of supervisory 
                                                          
2 Organizations are increasingly implementing group-based pay plans, such as profit sharing, gain sharing, and 
team-based rewards (Cooke 1994; Zenger and Marshall 2000; Hollensbe and Guthrie 2000, Church et al. 2012), and 
such groups may spread among hierarchies in an organization (Zenger and Marshall 2000) . Under group-based pay 
plans, compensation of each individual employee depends on the profits or other measures of performance of a 
group of employees (Cooke 1994; Hollensbe and Guthrie 2000). 
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behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty is predicted to be greater in the presence of shared 
financial interests than in the absence of shared financial interests. 
Third, I investigate how supervisory behavioral integrity differentiates from supervisory 
behavioral honesty in the effectiveness of promoting subordinate honesty. As stated earlier, in 
this study, supervisory behavioral integrity refers to whether the supervisor’s behavioral honesty 
aligns with the value communicated by the superior. Because the superior always communicates 
an ethical value to the subordinates, it is necessary to investigate whether it is the alignment of 
the superior’s behavioral honesty with the communicated ethical value or it is the superior’s 
behavioral honesty itself that impacts subordinate honesty. Drawing on organizational behavioral 
literature, I argue that, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, supervisory behavioral 
integrity has a greater impact on subordinate honesty because it increases the subordinates’ 
perceptions of the superior’s credibility and trustworthiness (Colquitt et al. 2007, Simons et al. 
2007; Palanski and Yammarino 2009; Leroy et al. 2012). 
To test my predictions, I use a lab experiment. In the experiment, participants act as a 
division manager (i.e. the superior) or a department manager in the division (i.e. the 
subordinate). The superior is responsible for communicating to the subordinate that the company 
values honesty. The superior also performs a self-reporting task, in which the superior is 
rewarded based on the reported performance. The subordinates are informed whether the 
superior reports exactly or reports higher than the actual performance. Then, each subordinate 
performs a capital budgeting task in which the subordinate makes a budget report to request 
funding to finance the department’s production costs. The subordinate’s honesty in the budget 
report is the dependent variable in the study. The timeline of experimental tasks is presented in 
Figure 1. 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To examine the effect of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty, I 
measure supervisory behavioral integrity (low versus high) as whether the superior’s honesty in 
self-reporting aligns with the communicated value of honesty. I also measure the subordinates’ 
perception of supervisory behavioral integrity in the post-experimental questionnaire. The results 
show that both supervisory behavioral integrity and the subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory 
behavioral integrity positively impact subordinate honesty. 
To investigate whether the presence of shared financial interests moderates the effect of 
supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty, I manipulate the presence of shared 
financial interests (no versus yes) by whether the subordinate gets a monetary reward based on 
the superior’s self-reported performance. Consistent with my prediction, supervisory behavioral 
integrity has a greater impact on subordinate honesty in the presence of shared financial interests 
than in the absence of shared financial interests. Specifically, the results suggest that supervisory 
behavioral integrity impacts subordinate honesty in budget reporting only in the presence of 
shared financial interests, while it has no impact on subordinate honesty in the absence of shared 
financial interests. Further, a path analysis provides evidence that psychological distance fully 
mediates the effect of shared financial interests and interacts with supervisory behavioral 
integrity to influence subordinate honesty. 
Finally, to distinguish between the effects of supervisory behavioral integrity and 
supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty, I manipulate whether the subordinates 
receive the superior’s communication of the honesty value (no vs. yes) before they perform the 
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capital budgeting tasks3. In the No Communication condition, the only factor to influence 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting is supervisory behavioral honesty, i.e. the superior’s 
honesty in the self-reporting task. In the Communication condition, it is the alignment between 
supervisory behavioral honesty and the communicated value of honesty that influences the 
subordinates’ budgeting honesty. Consistent with my predictions, the results suggest a significant 
interaction between supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty on 
subordinate honesty, suggesting that supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater impact on 
subordinate honesty than supervisory behavioral honesty. I further conduct a path analysis to 
examine the underlying mechanisms for the interaction. The results show that, compared to 
supervisory behavioral honesty, supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater impact on 
subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility and trustworthiness, which, in turn, 
influence the subordinates’ honesty in budget reporting. Moreover, the results report that 
supervisory behavioral honesty has a negative simple effect on subordinate honesty, i.e., in the 
absence of communication of an honesty value, subordinate honesty is lower when the superior 
is honest in self-reporting than when the superior is dishonest. Supplemental analysis suggests 
that vicarious moral licensing might explain the negative effect. That is, because the presence of 
shared financial interests reduces psychological distance between the superior and the 
subordinates, the subordinates may take moral credentials from the superior and are more willing 
to express immoral attitudes (Goldstein and Cialdini 2007; Kouchaki 2011) and report 
dishonestly in the capital budgeting task. 
                                                          
3 When examining the effects of supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate 
honesty, the study controls for the presence of shared financial interests, such that the subordinates are always 
financially impacted by the superior’s self-reporting. 
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The findings of this study have several implications for managerial accounting research 
and practice. First, superiors in organizations should not “talk the walk” unless they can “walk 
the talk”. This study shows that low supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater negative 
impact on subordinate honesty than low supervisory behavioral honesty. In other words, when 
the superior is unethical, the presence of an ethical espoused value may turn out to have a 
negative influence on subordinate behavior. Thus, companies need to caution against high level 
management attempting to communicate ethical values, such as a corporate value or a mission 
statement, to the employees without exhibiting behavior consistent with the values.  
Second, the study identifies the organizational setting where superiors in organizations 
should not “walk the talk” without “talking the walk”. Specifically, the study shows that, in the 
organizational setting where the subordinates may feel psychologically close to the superior, 
superior’s honesty may turn out to have a negative impact on subordinate honesty. The negative 
impact occurs only in the absence of an espoused value. In other words, in the organizational 
setting where the subordinates may feel psychologically close to the superior, superior’s ethical 
behavior may generate unwanted impacts on subordinate behavior if it is not accompanied by an 
ethical espoused value. This study proposes and examines one such organizational setting where 
the subordinates may feel psychologically close to the superior, i.e. the presence of shared 
financial interests. The implication of the findings may extend to other organizational settings 
that also influence the psychological distance. For example, subordinates tend to feel more 
psychologically close with the superior when the physical distance between them reduces and/or 
their interaction frequency increases (Yagil 1998). Power and hierarchical distance are also 
shown to influence the psychological distance between the superior and the subordinates 
(Antonakis and Atwater 2002). In a recent study, Choi et al. (2015) provide evidence that 
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observing others’ positive or negative outcomes in an organization impacts one’s psychological 
distance with those others. The findings of this study suggests that, in these organizational 
settings, superior’s ethical behavior may provide the potential moral buffer for the subordinates 
to self-justify their own immoral behavior, and thus exacerbate subordinate misbehavior. The 
study also provides insights into how companies may use a “low-cost” control mechanism to 
mitigate the demotion effect of superior’s ethical behavior on subordinate behavior. Specifically, 
the demotion effect of superior’s ethical behavior on subordinate behavior may be turned into a 
promotion effect if the superior also communicates the ethical espoused value to the 
subordinates.  
Further, this study proposes and examines a causal model to explain the interaction 
between the presence of shared financial interests and supervisory behavioral integrity on 
subordinate honesty. The interaction effect suggests that organizations may need to take their 
informal control environment into consideration when designing formal controls. For example, 
the presence of shared financial interests, such as group-based pay plans, may amplify the effect 
of supervisory behavioral integrity on employee honesty, thus management needs to fully 
understand their employees’ perceptions regarding supervisory behavioral integrity, using 
techniques such as surveys, before implementing such group-based pay plans. Also, the 
interaction effect identifies the organizational environment in which supervisory behavioral 
integrity is effective to promote subordinate honesty, i.e. the presence of shared financial 
interests, and therefore, only in this environment should companies invest in control systems, 
such as auditing, that may induce high supervisory behavior integrity in this environment.  
Finally, this study uses a design that holds a measured independent variable constant 
across conditions. The design is beneficial for not only for studies that use a measured 
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independent variable, but also for studies that use a randomly generated environmental factor, 
such as a risk factor or an effort-performance ratio, across conditions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section II presents the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses. Section III describes the method. Section IV presents the 
results from the experiment. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background 
Several management accounting studies have examined how informal control 
mechanisms may impact honesty in budget reporting (Kachelmeier et al. 1994; Rankin et al. 
2008; Zhang 2008; Matuszewski 2010). In general, informal control mechanisms may influence 
the ethical behavior of employees either by guiding employees’ implicit understandings of 
consequences of their behavior or through social influences (Sitkin et al. 2010). In the context of 
budget reporting, Krishnan et al. (2012) show that subordinates are more honest when the 
superior fulfills their psychological contracts whereby subordinates expect their superiors to 
fulfill the promise of participation. Kachelmeier et al. (1994) report that organizational “cheap 
talk” communication about the degree to which a potential project would be supported reduces 
employees’ intent to propose an unfavorable project. Other studies focus on the effect of social 
influence on employees’ budgeting behavior. In this type of informal control system, ethical 
behavior is induced by the environmental cues antecedent to it (Manz and Sims 1981). In the 
context of budgeting, studies have provided some examples of such environmental cues in 
organizations that induce honesty, such as requiring the budgets in the form of a factual assertion 
to imply a desire for honesty (Rankin et al. 2008), communicating non-contractual targets to the 
budget proposer (Newman 2014), and sharing budgetary slack with those with high preferences 
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for honesty (Church et al. 2012). Superior leadership ethics, such as the fairness in setting 
subordinate wages (Zhang 2008) and the introduction of horizontal equity of salary 
(Matuszewski 2010), are also shown to be effective control mechanisms to induce honesty in 
budget reporting.  
2.2 Supervisory Behavioral integrity 
In this study, I investigate the role of supervisory behavioral integrity to influence 
subordinate honesty. Supervisory behavioral integrity, i.e. the extent to which managers “talk the 
walk” and “walk the talk”, is essential in an organization (Simons 2002). It may serve as a social 
influence mechanism to impact employee behavior. Studies in organizational behavior provide 
evidence that high supervisory behavioral integrity leads to more organizational citizenship 
behavior and less deviant behavior (Dineen et al 2006) and results in higher employees’ trust in 
supervisors (Simons et al. 2007). Supervisory behavioral integrity also positively affects 
employees’ commitment to the organization (Fritz et al. 2013) and negatively affects their 
unethical behavior intention (Tang and Liu 2012). Prottas (2013) use data from the 2008 
National Study of the Changing Workforce survey and find that supervisory behavioral integrity 
is positively related to job satisfaction, job engagement, health, and life satisfaction and 
negatively related to stress, turnover likelihood, and work-to-family conflict.  
To develop the prediction on how supervisory behavioral integrity may influence 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting, I use Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm 
activation. Bicchieri’s model provides an operational definition of a social norm (Davidson and 
Stevens 2013) and predicts how and when environmental cues activate a social norm that may 
influence an individual’s behavior (Douthit and Stevens 2015). A social norm is a behavioral 
rule for an individual to choose in a mixed-motive situation. Bicchieri’s model suggests that an 
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individual would follow a social norm when environmental cues make the norm salient to the 
individual and fulfill both empirical and normative expectations to give the individual sufficient 
reasons to follow the norm (Bicchieri 2006; Bicchieri and Xiao 2009; Davidson and Stevens 
2013; Douthit and Stevens 2015). The empirical expectation refers to what they believe others 
typically do, and the normative expectation concerns what they believe others think they ought to 
do. In an organization, supervisory behavioral integrity may serve as the environmental cue to 
activate the norm of honesty in employees. 
First, I expect that supervisory behavioral integrity will make the norm of honesty salient 
to the subordinates. Superiors are usually viewed as standard bearers of the organization’s 
mission and values (Arnett and Fritz 2003). Dineen et al. (2006, p. 624) state that “supervisors’ 
actual conduct, in terms of how closely their actions are consistent with their stated principles … 
makes norms regarding appropriate workplace behaviors salient. That is, employees look for 
cues to reduce uncertainty and enhance predictability in their environments.” High supervisory 
behavioral integrity, i.e. the superior’s behavioral adherence to the communicated value of 
honesty, sends a clear signal to the subordinates that the value is followed and well honored in 
the organization. Low supervisory behavioral integrity, on the other hand, provides conflicting 
cues for the subordinates to understand how the company truly values the norm of honesty.  
Further, superior behavioral integrity also increases the congruence between 
subordinates’ empirical expectations and normative expectations to follow the behavioral rules. 
The superior’s communication of the espoused values, i.e. words, motivates the subordinate’ 
normative expectations of what others think the subordinate ought to do. When the superior’s 
behavior follows the espoused value, the subordinate’s empirical expectation is satisfied at the 
same time. Thus, when the superior’s deeds align with the words, the subordinates’ expectation 
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regarding what people will do is in line with their expectation regarding what people think they 
ought to do. “In this case, normative and empirical expectations work in the same direction and 
motivate the same behavior” (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). In contrast, when superior’s deeds are 
inconsistent with their words, the values communicated by words are violated, and thus the 
subordinate would experience an inconsistency between normative and empirical expectations.  
Overall, the discussion above leads to the following hypothesis4: 
H1: Subordinates will be more honest in budgetary reports when the superiors’ 
behavioral integrity is high than when it is low. 
 
2.3 The presence of shared financial interests 
In this subsection, I develop a causal model to predict how the effect of supervisory 
behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty is influenced by the presence of shared financial 
interests between the superior and the subordinates. The model is displayed in Figure 2. 
Specifically, I argue that the presence of shared financial interests decreases the subordinates’ 
psychological distance from the superior, and the reduced psychological distance, in turn, makes 
the subordinates more likely to behave consistent with the superior’s behavior. Overall, I predict 
that the positive effect of supervisory behavioral integrity becomes stronger in the presence of 
shared financial interest. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
                                                          
4 Other theory and models would also provide the same prediction. For example, moral disengagement theory 
(Bandura 1990, 1999) suggests that once their internalized controls has developed, individuals would regulate their 
actions by their self-regulatory mechanisms. Actions that violate their moral standards would bring them 
psychological costs, such as self-condemnation, and thus they tend to refrain from those actions. However, 
individuals can deactivate and disengage the moral standards through approaches such as moral justifications. In this 
study, it is easier for the subordinates to morally justify dishonest behavior when supervisory behavioral integrity is 
low and more difficult to do so when supervisory behavioral integrity is high. So, moral disengagement theory also 
predicts that subordinate budgeting honesty is higher when supervisory behavioral integrity is high.  
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2.3.1 The presence of shared financial interests and psychological distance 
The model first predicts that the presence of shared financial interests reduces the 
subordinates’ psychological distance from the superior. Psychological distance refers to the 
degree to which people perceive that they are related to other people, places, events, or points in 
time (Liberman et al. 2007b; Trope and Liberman 2010; Choi et al. 2015)5. People tend to feel 
psychologically close to others when they share common attributes, such as group memberships 
(Tajfel 1982), similar names (Miller et al. 1998; Jones et al. 2002), or the same birthday (Jones et 
al. 2004; Gunia et al 2009). People also feel psychologically close to others when they believe 
they share the same attitudes, values, or tastes (Brown et al. 1992), or when they have an 
interdependent mindset with those others (Gunia et al. 2009; Gino and Galinsky 2012). In this 
study, I argue that, in the presence of shared financial interest, the financial tie is the common 
attribute shared by the superior and the subordinates. The financial tie instills a stronger 
connection that the subordinates may perceive towards the superior, and increases the 
subordinates’ personal relevance with the superior’s behavior. Therefore, the presence of shared 
financial interest becomes the motivational force that induces the attachment-oriented feelings of 
the subordinates towards the superior. As a result, the subordinates feel psychologically closer to 
the superior in the presence of shared financial interests. 
2.3.2 The psychological distance and vicarious learning 
The reduced psychological distance in turn influences the subordinates’ vicarious 
learning from the superior (Goldstein and Cialdini 2007; Gunia et al. 2009; Gino and Galinsky 
                                                          
5 Depending on the reference points, the psychological distance has four dimensions: temporal, spatial, social, and 
hypothetical. In this study, the social dimension is most relevant, i.e. one’s perceived relation between the self and 
another person or people. I use the terms psychological distance and psychological closeness, instead of social 
distance and social closeness, throughout the texts. . The social psychology literature defines psychological 
closeness as an individual’s “feelings of attachment and perceived connection toward another person or people” 
(Gino and Galinsky 2012, p. 16). Napier and Ferris (1993) defines psychological closeness in an organization as 
“psychological effects of actual and perceived…differences between the supervisor and subordinate” (pp. 328-329). 
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2012; Choi et al. 2015). Social psychological studies suggest that when an individual observes an 
actor’s behavior and infers the actor’s internal attributes accordingly, he or she would go through 
self-perception changes to incorporate the inferred internal attributes. However, the self-
perception changes occur only if the observer feels psychologically close to the actor. Self-
perception changes, in turn, lead the observer to behave consistently with the actor’s behavior.  
Experimental social psychology studies have examined the relationship between 
psychological distance and vicarious learning. Gunia et al. (2009) show that participants are 
more likely to escalate their commitment to others’ decisions, even in the face of direct financial 
costs to themselves, when they feel psychologically close to those others. Gino and Galinsky 
(2012) examine the effect in the context of prosocial behaviors and provide evidence that 
psychological closeness produces both vicarious generosity and vicarious selfishness. 
Specifically, when the participants observe an actor’s selfish behavior, they tend to evaluate the 
behavior to be less shame-worthy and unethical when the psychological closeness to the actor is 
high than when it is low. As a result, the participants are more likely to behave selfishly 
themselves. In contrast, the participants are more likely to behave generously when the 
psychologically close others behaved generously. In cases of both generosity and selfishness, 
vicarious learning is significantly affected by the manipulated psychological distance.  
 
The subordinates may infer the superior’s internal attributes to be honest (dishonest) 
when supervisory behavioral integrity is high (low). Because the presence of shared financial 
interests reduces the psychological distance between the subordinates and the superior, the 
subordinates are more likely to incorporate the inferred internal attributes into themselves, and 
therefore more likely to behave consistent with the superior’s behavior. Overall, I predict that, 
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when supervisory behavioral integrity is high (low), the subordinates would be more (less) 
honest in budget reporting in the presence of shared financial interests than in the absence of 
shared financial interests. Formally stated, the hypothesis is: 
H2: The positive effect of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty in 
budget reporting is greater when the subordinates share financial interests in the superior’s 
behavior than when they do not share financial interests.  
The prediction in H2 may be subject to a counter-argument. In the presence of shared 
financial interests, the superior’s honesty in self-reporting reduces both the superior’s financial 
benefits and the subordinates’ financial benefits. The lower financial benefits may motivate the 
subordinates to report more dishonestly in budget reporting in order to gain a higher payoff. I 
refer this effect as the “size of the pie” effect. In the absence of shared financial interests, the 
subordinates share no financial interests in the superior’s behavior and thus are not subject to the 
“size of the pie” effect. Overall, when supervisory behavioral integrity is high, the “size of the 
pie” effect may lead the subordinates to be less honest in the presence of shared financial 
interests while it has no impact on the subordinate in the absence of shared financial interests.  
 
2.4 Supervisory behavioral integrity versus Supervisory behavioral honesty 
As stated earlier, because it lacks practical implications to study the setting where the 
superior communicates an unethical value to the subordinates (Fritz et al. 2013; Prottas 2013), 
this study investigates only the situation where the espoused value is ethical, i.e. the superior 
always communicates a value of honesty to the subordinates. Thus, a question arises as whether 
the existence of the ethical espoused value plays a role in influencing the subordinates’ behavior. 
In other words, whether supervisory behavioral integrity, i.e. the alignment of supervisory 
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behavioral honesty to the communicated value of honesty, has an incremental impact on 
subordinate behavior compared to supervisory behavioral honesty alone. 
The existence of an ethical espoused value improves information clarity in an 
organization (Fritz et al. 2013). Supervisory behavioral integrity, by definition, send two signals 
to the subordinates. The superior’s communication of a value of honesty sends a message to the 
subordinates on the organizational expectations regarding the subordinates’ behavior. The 
supervisory behavioral honesty provides the cues whether the expectations are followed by the 
standard bearers of the organization. High supervisory behavioral honesty clearly signals the 
subordinates that the communicated behavioral rule is expected to be followed. Low supervisory 
behavioral honesty, on the other hand, delivers the message that the communicated behavioral 
rule is not highly valued in the organization. In the absence of the communicated value of 
honesty, the subordinates may infer the internal attributes of the superior from the observed 
supervisory behavioral honesty. However, it is uncertain the extent to which the subordinates 
view the supervisory behavioral honesty as the behavioral rules and expectations of the 
organization.  
Further, the supervisor’s adherence to the clearly communicated ethical values indicates 
that he or she truly and sincerely values the communicated values (Simons 2002), which may 
impact the subordinates’ perceptions of the supervisor’s credibility and trustworthiness (Colquitt 
et al. 2007, Simons et al. 2007; Palanski and Yammarino 2009; Leroy et al. 2012). When the 
superior fails to value his or her own words, the subordinates may perceive the superior’s 
credibility and trustworthiness to be low. Empirical evidence suggests that when subordinates 
perceptions of the supervisor’s credibility and trustworthiness are high, they tend to perform 
better and display greater organizational commitments (Dirks and Ferrin 2002). In the absence of 
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the communicated value, the superior’s behavioral honesty has no association with whether the 
superior values or breaks his or her own words, and therefore, the impact of supervisory 
behavioral honesty on subordinates’ perceptions of superior’s credibility and trustworthiness is 
weaker. Overall, I predict that high supervisory behavioral integrity has a strong promoting 
effect on subordinate honesty than high supervisory behavioral honesty, and low supervisory 
behavioral integrity a stronger demotion effect on subordinate honesty than low supervisory 
behavioral honesty.  
H3: Controlling for the presence of shared financial interests between the superior and 
the subordinates, supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater effect on subordinate honesty 
than supervisory behavioral honesty. 
 
III. Method 
3.1 Experimental setting 
Participants in the experiment assume the role of either a division manager or a 
department manager in the division. Each division consists of one division manager (the 
superior, thereafter) and three department managers (the subordinates, thereafter). Each superior 
is randomly grouped with three subordinates6. The superior in all conditions is responsible for 
communicating to the subordinates that the company values honesty. The superior also performs 
a self-reporting task. Specifically, the superior first performs a decoding task and receives 
                                                          
6 In the experiment, the subordinates are not informed of the number of subordinates in each group. Each 
subordinate only reads that he or she is a department manager in a division and is randomly grouped with a division 
manager. This design eliminates the potential concerns that the subordinates may have, such as the fairness concerns 
or potential social comparisons among the subordinates. Also, each subordinate makes decisions independently in 
the experiment. That is, each subordinate’s decisions are not contingent on or influenced by the decisions of any 
other subordinates. Each subordinate has no information of any decisions made by any other subordinates. The 
payoffs of each subordinate are not influenced by the decisions made by any other subordinates as well. Therefore, 
although there are three subordinates in each group, the experimental task is not a group task, and each subordinate 
performs the experimental task independently.  
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accurate performance feedback indicating how many problems the superior decode correctly. 
Then, the superior is asked to report to a hypothetical corporate headquarters the number of 
correctly decoded problems. The superior may report either his or her actual performance or a 
greater number. The corporate headquarters does not have an audit system to verify the 
superior’s actual performance, so it always provides monetary rewards to the superior based on 
the reported performance, i.e. each superior receives 100 lira for each problem in the reported 
performance.  
Each subordinate performs and repeats a capital budgeting task for six rounds. The 
capital budgeting task is similar to the “trust contract” setting in Evans et al. (2001) and Church 
et al. (2012). In the capital budgeting task, the subordinates, i.e. the department managers, submit 
a budget report to the hypothetical corporate headquarters to request funds for the production 
cost of the departments. The subordinate’s private forecasting system reliably determines the 
actual production cost before the subordinate submits the budget7. The corporate headquarters 
only knows the possible range of the production costs, and never learns the actual cost; so, it 
provides funds equal to the subordinate’ budget as long as the budget is within the possible 
range. The same range of production costs is maintained over the six rounds of the capital 
budgeting task, while the actual cost changes among the six rounds. The actual cost for each 
round is predetermined with a random draw within the range, and the same actual cost is 
provided to all subordinates in each round. The study uses pre-determined costs for all 
subordinates in order to control for the equality of economic payoffs available to the 
subordinates and to ensure comparability across all subordinates. At the end of the experiment, 
                                                          
7 The budget report is in the format of a factual assertion, i.e. after the subordinates learn the actual cost in each 
round, they submit a budget report that states “[T]he actual cost in my department is  ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲”. This format of budget 
report disentangles the subordinates’ honesty preferences from other preferences such as equity preferences in 
budget reporting (Rankin et al. 2008). 
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one round is randomly selected to determine the payment period. The subordinates keep any 
differences between the budget and the actual cost in the selected round. As discussed in Church 
et al. (2012), this setting “allows the researcher to investigate the effect of behavioral factors 
when participants have strong economic incentives to act opportunistically” (p. 158). 
 
3.1.1 Supervisory behavioral integrity 
To test the hypotheses, I use a 2×2+2 mixed factorial design. Specifically, the 2×2 design 
is to examine H1 and H2. The first independent variable, supervisory behavioral integrity (high 
versus low), is measured as whether the superior’s behavior is consistent with the communicated 
honesty norm. This measurement is according to Simons’ (2002) definition of behavioral 
integrity, i.e. whether the superior’s honesty in the self-reporting task aligns with the 
communicated value on honesty. Since the superior communicates to the subordinates that the 
company values honesty, supervisory behavioral integrity is considered high if the superior is 
honest in the self-reporting task and low if the superior is dishonest. In order to avoid superior’s 
actual performance influencing the subordinates’ behavior, the superior’s actual performance is 
not disclosed to the subordinates. Instead, the subordinates are informed only whether the 
superior reports exactly or reports higher than his or her actual performance.  
 
3.1.2 The presence of shared financial interests 
The other independent variable, the presence of shared financial interests (no vs. yes), is 
manipulated as whether the subordinates get monetary rewards based on the superior’s reported 
performance. In each experimental session, one third of the subordinates are randomly assigned 
into the Shared Interest (SI condition thereafter) and one third of them are assigned into the No 
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Shared Interest condition (NSI condition thereafter). The remaining one third of the subordinates 
are assigned into the Behavioral Honesty condition (BH condition thereafter), which will be 
discussed later. Each subordinate in the SI condition and in the BH condition gets 80 lira for each 
problem that the superior reported as decoded correctly. Each subordinate in the NSI condition 
gets no monetary rewards from the superior. To keep the economic incentives for the subordinate 
constant across conditions, I vary the lira-to-dollar conversion rates for the subordinates across 
the two conditions so that the average payoffs in dollars are equal.  
 
3.1.3 Supervisory behavioral honesty 
In addition to the four cells from the 2×2 design discussed above, I also include two cells 
to test the effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty, i.e. to examine H3. In 
these two cells, the subordinates receive no communication from the superior that the company 
values honesty before the capital budgeting task. Therefore, the only factor to impact the 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting is the supervisory behavioral honesty, i.e. whether the 
superior reports honestly in the self-reporting task.  
 
In the experiment, I use the design that assigns the three subordinates in each division 
into the three experimental conditions, i.e. among the three subordinates, one subordinate is in 
the SI condition, one subordinate is in the NSI condition, and one subordinate is in the BH 
condition. This design ensures that the sample sizes across the three conditions are equal. 
Further, this design holds constant any environmental factors across conditions. The three 
subordinates across the three experimental conditions are interacting with the same superior, and 
therefore, the honesty level of the superior holds constant across conditions.  
21 
 
3.2 Procedures 
The computerized experiment is programed with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). The 
participants interact anonymously in the same room during the experiment. Participants are 
assigned to computer terminals upon arrival. Once all participants are seated, the general 
instructions of the study are distributed and read aloud. The instructions inform them that they 
will be acting either as a division manager or a department manager in the division. When 
reading the general instructions, I explicitly explain to them that the division manager is the 
superior and the department manager is the subordinate in the study. The instructions also 
described that the double-blind payment system keeps their decisions private from other 
participants and the researcher. After the general instructions, the computerized experiments 
begin, which consists of three parts: (1) role assignment and introduction of tasks, (2) task 
performance, and (3) post-experimental questionnaire and payment. A detailed description of the 
procedures is provided below. 
(1) Role assignment and introduction of tasks 
At the beginning of the computerized experiment, participants are first randomly assigned 
into the roles of superiors and subordinates. The subordinates are further randomly assigned into 
the SI, NSI and BH conditions. After learning their roles, participants get information about their 
tasks in the experiment. The superiors read details of the decoding task, and that their reporting 
behavior in the self-reporting task will be disclosed to the subordinates. The subordinates learn 
that they have two tasks in the study. In the first task, they play a passive role and receive the 
report whether the superior reports exactly or reports higher than the actual performance. The 
second task is a capital budgeting task, and the task details are introduced to them.  
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The participants also learn how their compensation will be affected by their own 
decisions and the decisions of other participants8. The superiors have a salary of 1,200 lira, and 
they will also get 100 lira from the corporate headquarters for each problem that they report as 
decoded correctly. Each subordinate has a salary of 1,000 lira. Further, each subordinate in the SI 
or BH conditions gets 80 lira from the corporate headquarters for each problem that the superior 
reports as decoded correctly. The subordinates in the NSI condition gets no monetary payoffs 
from the superior’s decoding task. In the budgeting task, the subordinates in all conditions keep 
the differences between the budget and the actual cost in the randomly selected round. Before 
continuing to their tasks, all participants have to correctly answer all questions in a 
comprehension test to ensure their understanding of the tasks and the payoff calculations. 
(2) Task performance 
After all participants pass the quiz, they proceed to the tasks. The division managers 
perform a decoding task for exactly three minutes. The decoding task consists of 10 problems in 
which they decode a series of numbers into letters. At the end of the 3 minutes, they are privately 
informed how many problems they decode correctly. Then, they have two tasks. One task is to 
communicate to the subordinates that the company values honesty. They read that “[A]s the 
division manager, it is your responsibility to communication to the department managers that the 
company values honesty”, and each superior is asked to send a message that “our company 
values honesty” to the subordinates in the division9. The other task is to report to the corporate 
headquarters how many questions they decode correctly. There are two options for them to 
                                                          
8 The subjects in the study only learn how their own payoffs are determined. They do not know the payoff schemes 
for any other subjects. 
9 The information provided to the superior would make the superior perceive that the message is sent to all 
subordinates in the division. To be consistent with this perception, subordinates in all experimental conditions 
receive the message. However, I vary the timing that the subordinates receive the message. The subordinates in the 
SI and NSI conditions receive the message before the capital budgeting task. The subordinates in the BH condition 
receive the message after they complete the capital budgeting task and the post-experimental questionnaire.  
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report, either to report at the actual performance or to report at the maximum number possible, 
i.e. 10. The superiors are aware that all subordinates in the division will receive a report whether 
the superior reports exactly or reports higher than the actual performance.  
When the superior completes the decoding task, the subordinates receive a report whether 
the superior reports exactly or reports higher than the actual performance. Before getting the 
report, the subordinates in the SI and NSI conditions first receive a message from the superior 
stating that the company values honesty, while the subordinates in the BH condition do not 
receive this message. Then, the subordinates perform the capital budgeting tasks for six rounds in 
the experiment. In each round, the subordinates, i.e. department managers, submit a budget to the 
hypothetical corporate headquarters to finance production in the department. The production 
costs are equally distributed in the range of 4,000 lira to 6,000 lira. The corporate headquarters 
only knows the distribution of the productions costs. The subordinate knows for certain what the 
actual cost would be before submitting the budget in each round. The subordinates decide 
whether to submit a budget equal to or higher than the actual cost. The subordinate may submit 
any number between the actual cost and 6,000 lira10. Headquarters provides the funds equal to 
the budget and never learns the actual cost.  
(3) Post-experimental questionnaire 
Once all participants complete their tasks, they finish a questionnaire that helps the 
researcher to understand their decisions. The questionnaire for the superior is to understand their 
decisions of whether to over-report in the self-reporting task. More importantly, the 
questionnaire for the subordinates measures their psychological distance with the superior, their 
                                                          
10 A budget lower than the actual cost is not accepted because it is irrational for the subordinates to pursue negative 
earnings. A budget higher than 6,000 lira is also not allowed because, in practice, a budget over the distribution 
range would be rejected by the corporate headquarters for certain. 
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perceptions of the superior’s behavioral integrity, the potential size of the pie effect, and their 
perceptions of the trustworthiness and credibility of the superior (see Appendix A). The 
reliability of the measures will be reported in Section IV.  
 
3.3 Dependent Measures 
The dependent variable in the study is the subordinates’ honesty in the capital budgeting 
task. Following Evans et al. (2001) and other studies on budget reporting, honesty is measured as 
a percentage. Specifically,  
𝐻𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑦 =  1 −
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
6,000−𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
. 
This equation measures honesty as the extent to which the subordinates are honest rather than 
purely self-interested. The measure takes the range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing the lowest 
honesty, i.e. purely self-interested behavior, and 1 representing the highest honesty, i.e. purely 
honest behavior. 
 
IV. Results 
172 students from a large public university in the U.S. participated in the experiment. 
Forty-nine percent of the participants were male, and the average age of the participants was 22. 
The experiment was conducted in the experimental economics laboratory and took an average of 
50 minutes to complete. Among the 172 participants, 43 played the role of superiors. As 
discussed in Section III, the independent variable, supervisory behavioral integrity, is measured 
as whether the superior’s honesty in the self-reporting task is consistent with the communicated 
honesty norm. Among the 43 superiors, 23 showed high behavioral integrity and 20 exhibited 
low behavioral integrity. The remaining 129 were assigned as the subordinates and were 
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randomly assigned into the SI, NSI and BH conditions. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
of the dependent variable, subordinates’ honesty in budget reporting, across conditions11. Among 
the six conditions, average subordinate honesty is highest when supervisory behavioral integrity 
is high in the presence of shared financial interests, and it is lowest when supervisory behavioral 
integrity is low in the presence of shared financial interests.  
[Insert Table 1] 
4.1 Hypothesis test 
4.1.1 Test of H1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that supervisory behavioral honesty has a positive impact on 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting. To test the H1, I conduct a repeated measures ANOVA 
between column (a) and column (b) in Table 1. The dependent variable is the subordinates’ 
honesty in budget reporting, which is a within-subject variable repeatedly measured over the six 
budgeting rounds. Table 2, Panel A, reports the ANOVA results. There is a significant main 
effect of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty in budget reporting. 
Specifically, the subordinates’ honesty is significantly higher when the supervisory behavioral 
integrity is high than when supervisory behavioral integrity is low (F1,82 = 21.12, p < 0.001), 
which is consistent with H1. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
In addition to measure supervisory behavioral integrity (low versus high) based on the 
superior’s self-reporting behavior, this study also uses three items in the post-experimental 
                                                          
11 The post-experimental questionnaire included two attention-check questions to verify whether the participants 
could correctly recall the superior’s behavioral integrity. The first question asked the subordinates in the SI and NSI 
conditions to recall the content of the message received from the superior, and all responses were correct. The 
second question asked the subordinates in all conditions whether the superior reported exactly or reported higher 
than the actual performance. Three participants failed this question. Results are inferentially identical if the three 
participants are excluded. 
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questionnaire to measure the subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity. The 
three items are adapted from Simons et al. (2007). Each item has a 1-11 scale (see Appendix A). 
Larger numbers on the scale reflect higher perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity. The 
reliability analysis shows a high internal consistency across the three questions. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the three questions is 0.95, and the intraclass correlation coefficient (0.95) is 
statistically different from zero (F85 = 20.457, p < 0.001). Further, the subordinates’ perceptions 
of the superior’s behavioral integrity are consistent with the superior’s measured behavioral 
integrity. The results of one-way ANOVA suggests that the subordinates’ perceptions of the 
supervisory behavioral integrity is significantly higher when the measured supervisory 
behavioral integrity is high (mean = 9.32) than when it is low (mean = 3.26), (F = 205.79, p < 
0.001, two-tailed, not tabulated). 
To examine the impact of the subordinates’ perception of supervisory behavioral on 
subordinate honesty, I employ a structural equation-based factorial analysis. The analysis uses 
the three items in the post-experimental questionnaire as reflective measures for the independent 
variable, perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity. Figure 3 depicts the results of analysis. 
The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 0.985, p = 
0.505). Subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity has a positive, significant 
effect on subordinate honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.429, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
4.1.2 Test of H2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an interaction effect. Specifically, it predicts that the positive effect 
of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty is greater in the presence of shared 
financial interests than in the absence of shared financial interests. The test of H2 is among the 
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four cells in column (a) and column (b) in Table 1. Table 2, Panel A, reports the repeated 
measures ANOVA results. The interaction effect is significant (F1,82 = 23.385, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that supervisory behavioral integrity is more effective in promoting subordinate 
honesty in budget reporting in the presence of shared financial interests than in the absence of 
shared financial interests.  Figure 4 illustrates the interaction effect. Further, Table 2, Panel B 
reports the simple effects of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty. In the 
presence of shared financial interests, supervisory behavioral integrity has a positive, significant 
effect on subordinate honesty in budgeting reporting (F1,41 = 57.734, p < .001). However, the 
effect is no longer significant in the absence of shared financial interests (F1,41 = .123, p = .728).  
 [Insert Figure 4 here] 
The results from the structural equation-based factorial analysis using the subordinates’ 
perception of supervisory behavioral integrity as the independent variable also support H2. As 
depicted in Figure 3, the interaction between perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity and 
the presence of shared financial interests has a significant effect on subordinate honesty 
(standardized coefficient = 0.464, p < 0.001, two-tailed). Furthermore, in the presence of shared 
financial interest, perception of supervisory behavioral integrity has a positive, significant effect 
on subordinate honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.930, p < 0.001, two-tailed, not tabulated)12, 
whereas in the absence of shared financial interests, it has no significant effect on subordinate 
honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.025, p = 0.780, two-tailed, not tabulated)13.  
Overall, the results suggest that the impact of supervisory behavioral integrity on 
subordinate honesty depends on the presence of shared financial interests between the superior 
                                                          
12 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.157, p = 0.267), GFI 
(0.881), CFI (0.991) and RMSEA (0.061). 
13 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.173, p = 0.250), GFI 
(0.881), CFI (0. 982) and RMSEA (0.064). 
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and the subordinates. Supervisory behavioral integrity may promote subordinate honesty only in 
the presence of shared financial interests. In the absence of shared financial interests, supervisory 
behavioral integrity is not effective in influencing the subordinates’ honesty.  
 
4.1.3 Test of H3 
H3 predicts that supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater effect on subordinate 
honesty than supervisory behavioral honesty. As noted earlier, the subordinates in the Behavioral 
Honesty condition in the experiment always share financial interests in the superior’s decoding 
task, i.e. they receive rewards based on the superior’s reported performance. Thus, to distinguish 
between the effects of supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty, the 
comparison is between the SI and the BH conditions. I will term the SI condition as the 
behavioral integrity condition, abbreviated as BI condition, to ease the discussion of the results 
for this subsection. Accordingly, the results are presented as a comparison between BI, i.e. 
behavioral integrity, and BH, i.e. behavioral honesty, conditions. BI condition refers to column 
(b) in Table 1, and BH condition refers to column (c) in Table 1. Further, because the difference 
between BI and BH is whether the superior communicates the value of honesty to the 
subordinates before the subordinates’ capital budgeting task, I term the independent variable as 
communication, which equals 0 for the BH condition where the subordinates receive no 
communication about the honesty value and equals 1 for the BI condition where the subordinates 
receive the communication. Further, when the superior is honest, both supervisory behavioral 
integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty are high, and vice versa. Therefore, the other 
independent variable, for the test of H3, is termed as superior honesty (0 = low and 1 = high). 
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Accordingly, the interaction effect predicted in H3 is translated as the positive effect of superior 
honesty on subordinate honesty is greater when communication equals 1 than when it equals 0. 
I conduct a repeated measures-ANOVA to examine the interaction effect between 
superior honesty and communication on subordinate honesty. Table 3 reports the results. There is 
an significant interaction effect (F1,82 = 48.273, p < 0.001), suggesting that the effect of 
superior’s honesty on subordinate honesty is greater in the BI condition than in the BH condition. 
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction effect. As superior honesty increases, supervisory behavioral 
integrity has a positive effect on subordinate honesty while supervisory behavioral honesty has a 
negative effect on subordinate honesty. Table 3, Panel B reports the simple effects of supervisory 
behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty. Both the positive effect of supervisory behavioral 
integrity on subordinate honesty (F1,41 = 57.734, p < .001) and the negative effect of supervisory 
behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty  (F1,41 = 5.038, p = .03) are significant.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
4.2 Supplemental analysis 
4.2.1 Moderated mediation model for H2 
To examine the mechanisms underlying the interaction effect in H2, I conduct a more 
comprehensive analysis of the moderated mediation model that is depicted in Figure 2. The 
model suggests that the presence of shared financial interests reduces the psychological distance 
between the superior and the subordinates, and the reduced psychological distance, in turn, 
moderates the influence of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty.  
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When examining the moderated mediation model, I only report the analysis that uses the 
measured supervisory behavioral integrity, i.e. whether the superior’s behavior is consistent with 
the communicated honesty norm. Results are inferentially identical from the analysis using the 
subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity as the independent variable.  
To measure the mediator in the model, i.e. subordinates’ psychological distance from the 
superior, I use a questionnaire with five items adapted from Doosje et al. (1995) and Choi et al. 
(2015). Each item has 1-11 scale (see Appendix A). Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of 
the subordinates’ responses to each of the five questions by the presence of shared financial 
interests. In the experimental instrument, the items measure how psychologically close the 
subordinates feel to the superior, and thus greater values reported in Table 4 represent smaller 
psychological distance and vice versa. The reliability analysis shows a high internal consistency 
across the five questions. The Cronbach’s alpha for the five questions is 0.87, and the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (0.87) is statistically different from zero (F = 7.676, p < 0.001).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In order to be consistent with the construct of psychological distance and improve 
interpretability, I reverse the measured scale of psychological distance in the data analysis, such 
that greater values reflect larger psychological distance. Thus, given the coding of the presence 
of shared financial interests (NSI = 0 and SI = 1), I expect a negative effect of the presence of 
shared financial interests on psychological distance. Further, as discussed earlier, as the 
psychological distance reduces, subordinates are more likely to be influenced by the superior’s 
behavior. Therefore, I predict a negative interaction effect of supervisory behavioral integrity and 
psychological distance on subordinate honesty.  
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I employ structural equations-based path analysis to examine the moderated mediation 
model. The results of the path analysis are depicted in Figure 6. The model provides a good fit 
for the data, as indicted by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.096, p = 0.210), GFI (0.855), CFI (0.990) 
and RMSEA (0.034). The results shown in Figure 6 are consistent with my expectations. 
Specifically, the presence of shared financial interests has a negative, statistically significant 
effect on psychological distance (standardized coefficient = -0.663, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
Further, the positive interaction effect between supervisory behavioral integrity and the presence 
of shared financial interests on subordinate honesty tested in H2 may be divided into two paths. 
First, the interaction between supervisory behavioral integrity and the presence of shared 
financials interest has a negative association with the interaction between supervisory behavioral 
integrity and psychological distance (standardized coefficient = - 0.821, p < 0.001, two-tailed). 
Mathematically, the negative association is driven by the negative relation between 
psychological distance and the presence of shared financial interests. Second, psychological 
distance moderates the effect of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate honesty 
(standardized coefficient = - 0.486, p < 0.001, two-tailed). The negative coefficient suggests that 
supervisory behavioral integrity has a stronger positive effect on subordinate honesty as 
psychological distance between the subordinates and the superior becomes smaller. Moreover, 
the path analysis reports the total effect, direct effect and indirect effect of (1) the presence of 
shared financial interests and (2) interaction between supervisory behavioral integrity and shared 
financial interest on subordinate honesty. As shown in Table 5, neither (1) nor (2) has a direct 
effect on subordinate honesty, suggesting that psychological distance fully mediates the effect of 
the presence of shared financial interests on subordinate honesty, and also the interaction 
between supervisory behavioral integrity and psychological distance fully mediates the 
32 
 
interaction effect of supervisory behavioral integrity and the presence of shared financial 
interests on subordinate honesty. Collectively, the results of the moderated mediation analysis 
are consistent with the model in Figure 2 explaining the mechanisms underlying the interaction 
effect in H2. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
4.2.2 Path analysis for H3 
The test of H3 shows that supervisory behavioral integrity has a greater effect on 
subordinate honesty than supervisory behavioral honesty. As discussed earlier, I argue that the 
greater effect may be explained by the impact on the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s 
credibility and trustworthiness. In this subsection, I conduct a structural equations-based path 
analysis to test the predicted effects. 
To measure the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s trustworthiness, the 
questionnaire uses two questions adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999). Both questions have a 
1-11 scale (see Appendix A), and a larger number on the scale represents that the subordinates 
perceive the superior to be more trustworthy. The reliability analysis shows a high internal 
consistency. The Cronbach’s alpha for the two questions is 0.86, and the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (0.86) is statistically different from zero (F = 7.022, p < 0.001). Also, the measures 
for the subordinates’ perceptions of the credibility of the superior are four items adapted from 
McCroskey’s (1966) credibility scale. The four items use a scale of 1-11 to measure the 
subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which the superior is friendly, caring, reliable, and 
honest. The reliability analysis shows a high internal consistency among the four items. The 
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Cronbach’s alpha is 0.90, and the intraclass correlation coefficient (0.90) is statistically 
different from zero (F = 9.654, p < 0.001).  
Figure 7 depicts the results of structural equations-based path analysis14. The path 
analysis shows that superior honesty and communication interactively impact the subordinates’ 
perception of the superior’s trustworthiness (standardized coefficient = 0.190, p = 0.016, two-
tailed) and credibility (standardized coefficient = 0.357, p < 0.050, two-tailed). Also, the 
subordinates’ perception of the superior’s trustworthiness positively affect subordinates’ honesty, 
and the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility marginally impact subordinates’ 
honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.357, p < 0.127, two-tailed, not tabulated). Overall, the 
results of the path analysis suggest that, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, supervisory 
behavioral integrity has a greater effect on subordinate honesty because it has a greater impact on 
the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility and trustworthiness.  
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
4.2.3 Analysis on the negative effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate 
honesty 
There are two alternative explanations for the negative, significant effect of supervisory 
behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty. The first explanation is the “size of the pie” effect. 
Because the subordinates in the supervisory behavioral honesty condition share financial 
interests in the superior’s decoding task, they may be subject to the “size of the pie” effect. That 
is, the superior’s honest reporting in the decoding task reduces the subordinates’ payoffs, which 
may motivate the subordinates to submit a higher budget. In the presence of the communicated 
value of honesty, the subordinates may perceive the superior’s honest reporting is following the 
                                                          
14 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.031, p = 0.398), GFI 
(0.892), CFI (0. 998) and RMSEA (0.019). 
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communicated honesty value, and therefore, the “size of the pie” effect is weaker compared to 
the absence of the communicated honesty value condition.  
In the post-experimental questionnaire, one question asks whether the subordinates prefer 
the superior to report exactly his or her actual performance, to report higher than his or her actual 
performance, or the subordinates are indifference between the two options. The “size of the pie” 
effect would predict that, as superior honesty increases, the likelihood that the subordinates 
prefer the superior to over-report should increase more in the absence of the communicated value 
of honesty than in the presence of the communication. However, Table 6, Panel A, reports that 
there is a negative, significant interaction effect of superior honesty and communication on the 
probability of the subordinates preferring the superior to over-report (Wald = 5.243, p = 0.022, 
two-tailed), suggesting that as superior honesty increases, the reduction in the likelihood of the 
subordinates’ preferring the superior to over-report is greater when communication equals 1 than 
when it equals 0. The results on simple effects, Table 6, Panel B, further show inconsistency with 
the size of the pie explanation. The simple effects show that when superior honesty increases, 
subordinates are less likely to prefer the superior to over-report when communication equals 1 
(Wald = 4.797, p = 0.029, two-tailed). When communication equals 0, however, superior honesty 
has no significant effect on the likelihood that the subordinate prefer the superior to over-report 
(Wald = 1.009, p = 0.315, two-tailed). Recall that communication equals 1 represents the 
supervisory behavioral integrity condition, and that communication equals 0 refers to the 
supervisory behavioral honesty condition. Thus, the results suggest that the subordinates are less 
likely to prefer the superior to over-report as supervisory behavioral integrity increases, while the 
likelihood has no change when supervisory behavioral honesty increase. Overall, the “size of the 
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pie” effect is not a valid explanation for the negative effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on 
subordinate honesty.  
The other explanation is the vicarious moral licensing effect. The vicarious moral 
licensing effect argues that when people feel psychologically close with others, they may take 
moral credentials from others’ prior moral behavior, which in turn make them more likely to do 
potentially immoral things without worrying about feeling immoral (Monin and Miller, 2001; 
Sachdeva et al. 2009; Monin and Jordan 2009; Goldstein and Cialdini 2007; Kouchaki 2011). In 
this study, the subordinates feel psychologically close to the superior in both the BI and BH 
conditions due to the presence of shared financial interests in both conditions. According to 
social psychology literature, when the psychological distance is small, the subordinates may 
vicariously take moral credentials from the superior’s moral behavior, such as honest self-
reporting. In the absence of the communicated value of honesty, take moral credential from the 
superior’s behavior may make the subordinates more likely to report dishonestly without feeling 
immoral. However, in the presence of the communicated value of honesty, it is against the 
communicated value of honesty to report dishonestly in budget reporting, and therefore, the 
subordinates may feel immoral be report dishonestly no matter whether they have taken moral 
credentials from the superior’s behavior. Thus, I predict that supervisory behavioral honesty 
leads to a vicarious moral licensing effect on subordinates, while the effect is weaker or 
insignificant for supervisory behavioral integrity. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, I use three items to measure how the subordinates 
evaluate the importance of the characteristic of honesty after observing the superior’s behavior. 
The three items are adapted from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) and Kouchaki (2011), and each item 
uses a 1-11 scale. A larger value on the scale reflects that the subordinates evaluate the 
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characteristic of honesty is more important to him or her. The three items show a high internal 
consistency. The Cronbach’s alpha for the three questions is 0.78, and the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (0.78) is statistically different from zero (F129 = 4.521, p < 0.001). The vicarious 
moral licensing explanation predicts that supervisory behavioral honesty negatively impacts the 
subordinates’ evaluations of the importance of the characteristic of honesty, while supervisory 
behavioral integrity has a smaller negative effect or no significant effect. Figure 8 depicts the 
results of structural equations-based path analysis. As shown in the figure, superior honesty and 
communication interactively impact the subordinate’s evaluation of the importance of the 
characteristic of honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.221, p < 0.001, two-tailed). The 
subordinates’ evaluation of the importance of the characteristic of honesty further influences 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting (standardized coefficient = 0.455, p = 0.015, two-
tailed)15. A further examination on the simple effects, also depicted in Figure 8, reports that 
supervisory behavioral integrity has no significant effect on the subordinate’s evaluation of the 
importance of the characteristic of honesty16. Supervisory behavioral honesty, however, has a 
negative, significant effect on the subordinate’s evaluation of the importance of the characteristic 
of honesty (standardized coefficient = 0.237, p = 0.011, two-tailed), and the subordinate’s 
evaluation of the importance of the characteristic of honesty has a positive, significant effect on 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting (standardized coefficient = 0.796, p = 0.008, two-
tailed)17. The analysis on the total effect, direct effect and indirect effect reports that the 
subordinate’s evaluation of the importance of the characteristic of honesty fully mediates the 
                                                          
15 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.166, p = 0.205), GFI 
(0.903), CFI (0.987), and RMSEA (0.044).  
16 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 1.158, p = 0.25), GFI (0.859), 
CFI (0.986), and RMSEA (0.061). 
17 The model provides a good fit for the data, as indicated by a traditional χ2 test (χ2 = 0.915, p = 0.61), GFI (0.869), 
CFI (1.000), and RMSEA (0.000). 
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negative effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty (total effect = -0.319, 
direct effect = 0, and indirect effect = -0.319, not tabulated). Overall, the results from the 
structural equations-based path analysis suggest that the vicarious moral licensing effect might 
explain the negative effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty. 
 
V. Discussion and conclusion 
In this study, I conduct an experiment to investigate the role of supervisors in influencing 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting in an organization. I find that supervisory behavioral 
integrity, i.e. the alignment between the superior’s words and deeds, is an effective informal 
control mechanism to influence employee honesty. However, the effectiveness of supervisory 
behavioral integrity depends on the presence of shared financial interests between the superior 
and the subordinates, such that high supervisory behavioral integrity may promote employee 
honesty only in the presence of shared financial interests. In the absence of shared financial 
interests, supervisory behavioral integrity is no longer effective in influencing employee honesty. 
Further, I develop and find support for a causal model that explains the interaction effect. The 
model explains that the presence of shared financial interests reduces psychological distance the 
subordinates feel from the superior, and the reduced psychological distance leads the 
subordinates to more likely behave consistent with the superior’ behavioral ethics. Moreover, I 
distinguish between supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty on their 
impacts on subordinate honesty. Consistent with my prediction, the results suggest that, in the 
presence of shared financial interests, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, supervisory 
behavioral integrity has a stronger influence on subordinate honesty because it impacts the 
subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility and trustworthiness. Furthermore, in the 
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presence of shared financial interests, high supervisory behavioral integrity promotes subordinate 
honesty, while high supervisory behavioral honesty turns out to demote subordinate honesty. The 
supplemental analysis shows that the demotion effect of supervisory behavioral honesty on 
subordinate honesty might be explained by the vicarious moral licensing effect, i.e. due to the 
reduced psychological distance between the superior and the subordinates, the subordinates may 
take moral credentials from the superior’s ethical behavior and are more willing to express 
immoral attitudes. 
This study provides insight on the role of supervisors and senior managers in an 
organization may play in influencing the behavioral ethics of the employees, establishing the 
theoretical explanation of how employees may vicariously learn from the superior’s behavioral 
integrity. Further, the superiors’ influence varies across the organizational environments when 
the organizational environments impact the psychological distance between the supervisors and 
the employees. The findings are important for practice because it identifies that the 
organizational settings where the subordinates feel a low psychological distance from the 
superiors are most beneficial for companies to invest their limited resources to audit or monitor 
the behavioral integrity of supervisors or senior managers. On the other hand, in the 
organizational settings where the subordinates feel a high psychological distance from the 
superior, investing in such a costly system to induce high supervisory behavioral integrity brings 
no significant benefits to the companies because supervisory behavioral integrity has no 
significant impact on subordinate honesty in these organizational settings. 
Further, this study contributes to the understanding of why managers should both “walk 
the talk” and “talk the walk”, especially in the organizational setting where the subordinates may 
feel a low psychological distance from the superior. The study suggests that managers’ 
39 
 
communication of organizational values to the subordinates without exhibiting behavior 
consistent with the values demotes employee honesty more than managers’ unethical behavior 
alone. The findings are of particular importance to the accounting literature in light of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Section 406, requirements of the organizations to disclose the adoption of a corporate 
code of ethics or otherwise to justify the absence of such a code of ethics. This study suggests 
that senior managers’ unethical behavior, such as misreporting, may result in more unwanted 
behaviors from the employees and higher costs for the companies in the presence of the 
corporate code of ethics than in the absence of such a code. Thus, following the code of ethics, 
i.e. “walking the talk”, not only benefits the outside stakeholders of the organization such as 
investors and creditors, but also benefits the business itself by reducing unwanted employee 
behavior and promoting wanted employee behavior.  
In the meanwhile, this study provides evidence that, in the organizational environment 
where the psychological distance between the superior and the subordinates are low, superior’s 
ethical behavior may have a demotion effect on employee behavior. The demotion effect occurs 
only in the absence of a communicated ethical value, and a possible explanation for the demotion 
effect is that subordinates may take moral credentials from the superior’s behavior in the absence 
of such a communicated value. When the superior communicates the ethical value, superior’s 
ethical behavior effectively promotes employee behavior. Thus, managers’ “talking the walk” 
also play an important role in influencing the behavior of employees. 
As with prior experimental studies of employee honesty, this study tests relevant theory 
in a controlled environment to maintain internal validity. The experimental setting abstracts the 
decision environments in practice. Therefore, the generalizability of the theory in this study may 
be subject to the influence of other factors. For example, the subordinates expect the superior’s 
40 
 
behavioral integrity by observing the superior’s behavior in one self-reporting task in this study. 
Future research may provide insights to investigate how repeated interactions between the 
superior and the subordinates may influence the subordinates’ perception regarding the 
consistency of the superior’s behavioral integrity, and how consistency in the superior’s 
behavioral integrity may influence the subordinates’ ethical behavior. Also, this study provides 
the theoretical basis to explain how supervisory behavioral integrity may promote desirable 
behavior of subordinate in organizations. Although this study tests the effect in a budgeting 
setting, the mechanisms through which supervisory behavioral integrity impacts subordinate 
behavior may generalize to other settings in organizations. Future studies may examine the effect 
of supervisory behavioral integrity on subordinate behavior in other organizational settings, and 
explore whether this effect may be moderated by different informal and formal control schemes. 
Moreover, this study distinguishes between the effect of supervisory behavioral integrity 
and supervisory behavioral honesty on subordinate honesty while controlling for presence of 
shared financial interests. Future studies may examine whether the interaction between 
supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty is significant in a setting of 
the absence of shared financial interests and whether supervisory behavioral honesty has a 
promotion or demotion effect on subordinate honesty in that setting. If the results suggest a 
promotion effect, future studies may seek and test whether vicarious moral licensing effect is the 
underlying mechanism or there are alternative explanations for moderation between supervisory 
behavioral honesty and the presence of shared financial interests. 
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Appendix A – Post-experimental questionnaire 
Measures for psychological distance 
Please provide your opinion on the following questions. Answer these questions as how you feel 
RIGHT NOW. 
1. How familiar are you to the division manager? 
1 (not at all familiar)            11 (very familiar) 
 
2. How close are you to the division manager? 
1 (not at all close)   11 (very close) 
 
3. How likely is it that you would do things in the same way as the division manager? 
1 (not at all likely)   11 (very likely) 
 
4. How likely is it that you would be friends with the division manager?  
1 (not at all likely)   11 (very likely) 
 
5. How strong do you feel the tie between you and the division manager?  
1 (There is not tie at all)  11 (There is a very strong tie) 
 
The following questions are designed to collect information to help the researchers understand 
your budgeting decision.  Please be assured that you cannot be personally identified from your 
responses.  Please be as candid as possible. 
Measures for the size of the pie effect 
1. Which of the following did you prefer happening? 
a. The division manager reports his or her actual performance. 
b. The division manager reports higher than his or her actual performance. 
c. I was indifferent whether the division manager reports exactly or higher than his or 
her performance. 
Measures for the subordinates’ perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity 
2. There is a match between the division manager’s words and actions. 
1 (strongly disagree)  11 (strongly agree) 
 
3. The division manager conducts himself/herself by the same values he/she talks about. 
1 (strongly disagree)  11 (strongly agree) 
 
4. When the division manager promises something, I can be certain that it will happen. 
1 (strongly disagree)  11 (strongly agree) 
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Measures for the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s trustworthiness 
5. Indicate the degree to which you agree with each statement below. 
 
(1) I would be willing to let the division manager have complete control over my future 
in the company. 
1 (strongly disagree)  11 (strongly agree) 
 
(2) I would be comfortable giving the division manager a task or problem which was 
critical to me, even if I could not monitor his or her actions. 
1 (strongly disagree)  11 (strongly agree) 
Measures for the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility 
6. To what extent, in your opinion, does the division manager possess each of the following 
characteristics? 
a. Friendly: 1 (not at all friendly)  11 (very friendly) 
b. Caring:    1 (not at all caring)  11 (very caring)  
c. Reliable: 1 (not at all reliable)  11 (very reliable) 
d. Honest:   1 (not at all honest)  11 (very honest) 
Measures for the subordinates’ evaluation of the importance of the characteristic of honesty 
7. Please provide you opinion on the following questions: 
(1) How would it make you feel to be a person who has the characteristic of honesty? 
1 (extremely bad)    11 (extremely good) 
 
(2) How important is the characteristic of honesty to be a part of who you are? 
1 (absolutely unimportant)  11 (absolutely importance) 
 
(3) How strongly do you desire to have the characteristic of honesty? 
1 (I don’t desire the characteristic at all) 11 (I desire the characteristic very strongly) 
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Figure 1: Timeline of experimental tasks 
 
Superior: 
Perform 
decoding 
task 
 
Receive 
performance 
feedback 
 
Communicate to 
the subordinate 
of the honesty 
norm 
 
Report the 
number of 
correctly decoded 
problems 
   
 
          
           
Subordinate: 
(In the absence 
or presence of 
shared 
financial 
interests 
conditions) 
Wait for the superior to finish 
the decoding task 
  
Receive the 
message from the 
superior about the 
honesty norm* 
 
 
Receive the reports 
whether the superior 
reports exactly or 
over-reports the 
actual performance 
 
Perform capital 
budgeting task 
 
 
Subordinate: 
(behavioral 
honesty 
condition) 
Wait for the superior to finish 
the decoding task 
  
 
Receive the reports 
whether the superior 
reports exactly or 
over-reports the 
actual performance 
 Perform capital 
budgeting task 
 
 
 
 
* Subordinates in the behavioral honesty condition receive this message after completing the capital budgeting task and the post-
experimental questionnaire. 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized causal model for H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Supervisory Behavioral Integrity refers to the alignment between espoused values, i.e. the 
values expressed by a superior’s words, and enacted values expressed by the superior’s deeds in 
an organization. A higher level of supervisory behavioral integrity reflects a higher degree of 
alignment between the superior’s words and deeds. 
b Subordinate honesty in budget reporting refers to the extent to which the subordinates honestly 
report the production cost in capital budgeting. As over-reporting in capital budgeting increases, 
subordinate honesty in budget reporting decreases. 
c The presence of shared financial interests refers to whether the subordinates are financially 
impacted by the superior’s behavior.  
d Psychological distance refers to the degree to which people perceive that they are related to 
other people, places, events, or points in time. In this model, psychological distance refers to how 
the subordinates feel related to the superior. A greater value of psychological distance reflects a 
larger distance that the subordinates psychologically feel against the superior. 
 
  
Supervisory 
Behavioral 
Integrity a 
Subordinate 
honesty in budget 
reporting b 
The presence of 
shared financial 
interests c 
Psychological 
distance d 
–   
+   
–   
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Figure 3: H1 and H2 – Structural equation-based factual analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fit index: χ2 = 0.985 (p = 0.505). 
Standardized path coefficients are presented. 
*** Two-tailed p-value < 0.001 
**   Two-tailed p-value = 0.003  
a Perceptions of supervisory behavioral integrity measures the subordinates’ perceptions of the 
superior’s behavioral integrity. It is continuous, with a larger value representing higher 
supervisory behavioral integrity 
b The presence of Shared financial interests is a manipulated variable. It equals 0 in the absence 
of shared financial interests condition and equals 1 in the presence of shared financial interests 
condition. 
c Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting 
task for six rounds. It is continuous between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher 
subordinate honesty.  
  
Perceptions of 
supervisory behavioral 
Integrity a 
The presence of shared 
Financial Interests b 
Perceptions of 
supervisory behavioral 
integrity × The 
presence of shared 
financial interests 
Subordinate 
honesty c 
0.429*** 
0.464*** 
0.191** 
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Figure 4: H2 – Repeated measures ANOVA results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV = Subordinate honesty 
Supervisory behavioral integrity 
Presence of shared financial interests 
Absence of shared financial interests 
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Figure 5: Test of H3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Superior honesty 
DV = Subordinate honesty 
Supervisory behavioral honesty 
Supervisory behavioral integrity 
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Figure 6: Moderated Mediation Analysis for H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fit indices: χ2 = 1.096 (p = 0.210), GFI = 0.855, CFI = 0.990, RMSEA = 0.034. 
Standardized path coefficients are presented. 
*** Two-tailed p-value < 0.001 
**   Two-tailed p-value = 0.002  
a Supervisory behavioral integrity is measured as whether the superior’s honesty in self-reporting is consistent with the honesty value 
the superior communicated to the subordinates. It equals 0 when supervisory behavioral integrity is low, i.e. the superior is dishonest 
while communicating the value of honesty. It equals 1 when supervisory behavioral integrity is high, i.e. the superior is honest when 
communicating the value of honesty.  
Supervisory behavioral 
integrity a 
Supervisory behavioral 
integrity × Presence of 
shared financial interests 
Subordinate honesty d 
0.372*** 
- 0.821*** 
- 0.663*** Presence of shared 
Financial Interests b 
Psychological distance c 
Supervisory behavioral 
integrity × 
Psychological distance 
- 0.486*** 
- 0.238** 
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b The presence of Shared financial interests is a manipulated variable. It equals 0 in the absence of shared financial interests condition 
and equals 1 in the presence of shared financial interests condition. 
c Psychological distance measures the extent to which the subordinates feel related to the superior. It is continuous with a larger value 
representing greater psychological distance the subordinates’ feel from the superior.  
d Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting task for six rounds. It is continuous 
between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher subordinate honesty. 
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Figure 7: Path analysis for H3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fit indices: χ2 = 1.031 (p = 0.398), GFI = 0.892, CFI = 0.998, RMSEA = 0.019. 
Standardized path coefficients are presented. Only significant coefficients are not presented. 
*** Two-tailed p-value < 0.001 
**   Two-tailed p-value < 0.01  
*    Two-tailed p-value < 0.05 
a Superior honesty is dischotomous. It equals 0 when the supeior over-reports his or her actual performance in the decoding task and 
equals 1 when the superior honestly reports his or her actual performance in the decoding task . 
Superior honesty × 
Communication 
Subordinate honesty f  
0.190* 
Communication b 
Subordinates’ 
perception of superior 
trustworthiness e 
Subordinates’ 
perception of 
superior credibility d 
0.242** 
Superior honesty a 
0.623* 
2.651 *** 
0.357* 
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b Communication is dichotomous. It equals 0 for the supervisory behavioral honesty condition and equals 1 for the supervisory 
behavioral integrity condition. In the supervisory behavioral integrity condition, the subordinates receive the superior’s 
communication of the honesty value before the performing the capital budgeting task. In the supervisory behavioral honesty condition, 
the subordinates receive no communication from the superior about the honesty value before the capital budgeting task. 
c Subordinates’ social identity with the superior measures the degree to which the subordinates feel socially identified with the 
superior. It is continuous, with a greater value reflects that the subordinates feel more socially identified with the superior.  
d Subordinates’ perception of superior credibility measures the degree to which the subordinates perceive the superior to be credible. 
It is continuous, with a greater value reflects that the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s credibility are higher.  
e Subordinates’ perception of superior trustworthiness measures the degree to which the subordinates perceive the superior to be 
trustworthy. It is continuous , with a greater value reflects that the subordinates’ perceptions of the superior’s trustworthiness are 
higher.  
f Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting task for six rounds. It is continuous 
between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher subordinate honesty. 
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Figure 8: Supplemental analysis – vicarious moral licensing effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fit indices: χ2 = 1.166 (p = 0.205), GFI (0.903), CFI (0.987), and RMSEA (0.044). 
 
Simple effects:  
Supervisory behavioral integrity condition (Communication = 1) 
 
 
 
Fit indices: χ2 = 1.158 (p = 0.25), GFI (0.859), CFI (0.986), and RMSEA (0.061). 
 
Supervisory behavioral honesty condition (Communication = 0) 
 
 
 
Fit indices: χ2 = 0.915 (p = 0.61), GFI (0.869), CFI (1.000), and RMSEA (0.000). 
Standardized path coefficients are presented. Only significant coefficients are presented. 
**    Two-tailed p-value < 0.01  
Subordinate 
honesty d 
0.455* 
Superior honesty a 
Communication b 
Superior honesty × 
Communication 
Evaluation of the 
characteristic of 
honesty c 
0.221** 
Superior honesty a 
Evaluation of the 
characteristic of 
honesty c 
Subordinate 
honesty d 
Superior honesty a 
Evaluation of the 
characteristic of 
honesty c 
Subordinate 
honesty d 
-0.237* 0.769** 
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*      Two-tailed p-value < 0.05  
a Superior honesty is dichotomous. It equals 0 when the supeior over-reports his or her actual 
performance in the decoding task and equals 1 when the superior honestly reports his or her 
actual performance in the decoding task . 
b Communication is dichotomous. It equals 0 for the supervisory behavioral honesty condition 
and equals 1 for the supervisory behavioral integrity condition. In the supervisory behavioral 
integrity condition, the subordinates receive the superior’s communication of the honesty value 
before the performing the capital budgeting task. In the supervisory behavioral honesty 
condition, the subordinates receive no communication from the superior about the honesty value 
before the capital budgeting task. 
c Evaluation of the characteristic of honesty measures the subordinates’ evaluations of the 
importance of the characteristic of honesty after observing the superior’s behavior. It is 
continuous, with a greater value reflects that the subordinates evaluate the characteristic of 
honesty to be more important.  
d Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting 
task for six rounds. It is continuous between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher 
subordinate honesty. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Subordinate honesty in budget reporting  
Mean (SD) The presence of shared financial interests 
N No Yes    Yes 
Supervisory 
behavioral 
integrity 
Low 
0.317 (0.295) 0.197 (0.243)  
Superior 
behavioral 
honesty 
Low 
0.452 (0.245) 
N = 20 N = 20  N = 20 
High 
0.345 (0.228) 0.745 (0.230)  
High 
0.289 (0.234) 
N = 23 N = 23  N = 23 
Columns: *  (Column a) (Column b)    (Column c) 
  
Subordinate honesty in budget reporting = the average of the subordinates’ honesty across the six budgeting rounds. It is continuous 
between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher subordinate honesty. 
Experimental conditions: 
(1) Supervisory behavioral integrity is measured as whether the superior’s honesty in self-reporting is consistent with the value of 
honesty that the superior communicated to the subordinates.  
 Supervisory behavioral integrity is low: the superior communicates the value of honesty but is dishonest in self-reporting.  
 Supervisory behavioral integrity is high: the superior communicates the value of honesty and is honest in self-reporting.  
(2) The presence of shared financial interests is manipulated as whether the subordinates are financially impacted by the superior’s 
behavior.  
 “No” condition: The superior’s self-reporting task has no impact on the subordinate’ payoffs. 
 “Yes” condition: The subordinate receives a reward based on the superior’s reported performance in the self-reporting task. 
(3) Supervisory behavioral honesty refers to the situation where the subordinates receive no communication from the superior about 
the value of honesty before the capital budgeting task, and thus, the only factor to influence the subordinates’ honesty in the 
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supervisory behavioral honesty condition is the superior’s honesty in self-reporting. Also, the presence of shared financial interests is 
held as “Yes” in the supervisory behavioral honesty condition. 
 Supervisory behavioral honesty is low: the supeior over-reports his or her actual performance in the decoding task.  
 Supervisory behavioral honesty is high: the superior honestly reports his or her actual performance in the decoding task. 
* The tests of H1 and H2 are among the four cells in column a and column b. The analysis to disentangle between the effects of 
supervisory behavioral integrity and supervisory behavioral honesty is among the four cells in column b and column c.  
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Table 2: ANOVA results 
 
Dependent variable = Subordinate honesty a 
  SS df MS F-statistic p-value* 
Panel A: two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
Integrity b 10.655 1 10.655 21.123 .000 
Sharing c 2.514 1 2.514 6.768 .011 
Integrity × Sharing 8.687 1 8.687 23.385 .000 
Residual 30.461 82 .371   
  
Panel B: one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
 
The absence of shared financial interests condition (Sharing c = 0) 
Integrity b .050 1 .050 .123 .728 
Residual 16.761 41 .409   
 
The presence of shared financial interests condition (Sharing c = 1) 
Integrity b 19.292 1 19.292 57.734 .000 
Residual 13.700 41 .334   
 
a Subordinate honesty: the subordinates’ honesty in budget reporting repeated measured across 
the six rounds. It is continuous between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher 
subordinate honesty. 
b Integrity: supervisory behavioral integrity. Integrity equals 0 when supervisory behavioral 
integrity is low and equals 1 when supervisory behavioral integrity is high. 
c Sharing: the presence of shared financial interests. It equals 0 in the absence of shared financial 
interests condition and equals 1 in the presence of shared financial interests condition. 
* p values are two-tailed. 
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Table 3: Test of H3 
 
Dependent variable = Subordinate honesty a  
  SS df MS F-statistic p-value 
Panel A: two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
Superior honesty b 4.742 1 4.742 14.026 .000 
Communication c 1.302 1 1.302 3.851 .053 
Superior honesty × 
Communication 
16.273 1 16.273 48.134 .000 
Residual 27.723 82 .338   
  
Panel B: one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
  
Supervisory behavioral honesty condition (Communication = 0) 
Superior honesty 1.723 1 1.723 5.038 .030 
Residual 14.022 41 .342   
      Supervisory behavioral integrity condition (Communication = 1) 
Superior honesty 19.292 1 19.292 57.734 .000 
Residual 13.700 41 .334   
 
a Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting 
task for six rounds. It is continuous between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher 
subordinate honesty. 
b Superior honesty is dichotomous. It equals 0 when the supeior over-reports his or her actual 
performance in the decoding task and equals 1 when the superior honestly reports his or her 
actual performance in the decoding task . 
c Communication is dichotomous. It equals 0 for the supervisory behavioral honesty condition 
and equals 1 for the supervisory behavioral integrity condition. In the supervisory behavioral 
integrity condition, the subordinates receive the superior’s communication of the honesty value 
before the performing the capital budgeting task. In the supervisory behavioral honesty 
condition, the subordinates receive no communication from the superior about the honesty value 
before the capital budgeting task.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics – Psychological distance 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
Questions a 
 
Presence of shared 
financial interests b 
   
Supervisory 
behavioral  
No Yes honesty 
c 
Q1: How familiar are you to the division 
manager? 
2.30 (1.319) 6.23 (1.461) 5.58 (1.918) 
Q2: How close are you to the division manager? 2.93 (2.017) 7.00 (1.839) 6.88 (2.291) 
Q3: How likely is it that you would do things in 
the same way as the division manager? 
4.07 (2.453) 7.88 (1.905) 6.86 (1.922) 
Q4: How likely is it that you would be friends 
with the division manager? 
4.07 (2.165) 6.86 (1.781) 6.07 (1.696) 
Q5: How strong do you feel the tie is between 
you and the division manager? 
3.00 (1.690) 6.60 (2.151) 6.98 (1.896) 
 
a Each question uses a 1-11 scale to measure the extent to which the subordinates feel related to 
the superior. For each question, a higher response value indicates that the subordinate feels 
psychologically closer to the superior, and thus it represents a smaller psychological distance. 
However, in order to increase interpretability and to be consistent with the construct of 
psychological distance, a reversed scale is used in data analysis such that a larger value reflects a 
greater psychological distance. 
b The presence of shared financial interests is a manipulated variable. It equals 0 in the absence 
of shared financial interests condition and equals 1 in the presence of shared financial interests 
condition. 
c Supervisory behavioral honesty refers to the condition where the subordinates receive no 
communication from the superior about the value of honesty before the capital budgeting task. 
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Table 5: Moderated mediation for H2 – Total effects, direct effects, and indirect effects a 
 
DV = Subordinate honesty b Total effect Direct effect Indirect effect 
Presence of shared financial interests 0.194 0.000 0.194 
Supervisory behavioral integrity × Presence of 
shared financial interests  0.489 0.000 0.489 
 
a This table reports total effects, direct effects and indirect effects for the model depicted in 
Figure 5. Specifically, this table reports the effects on two paths in the model: (1) the effect of 
the presence of shared financial interests on subordinate honesty mediated by psychological 
distance, and (2) the effect of the interaction between supervisory behavioral integrity and the 
presence of shared financial interests on subordinate honesty mediated by the interaction 
between supervisory behavioral integrity and psychological distance. The existence of significant 
mediation effects on both paths together supports the moderated mediation model. 
b Subordinate honesty is a latent variable reflected by the subordinates’ honesty in the budgeting 
task for six rounds. It is continuous between 0 and 1, with a greater value representing higher 
subordinate honesty. 
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Table 6: Test on the size of the pie effect 
Dependent variable =The likelihood of the subordinate preferring the superior to over-report a 
  B S.E. Wald p-value 
Panel A: Logistic regression – Interaction effect 
Superior honesty b 0.629 0.626 0.100 .315 
Communication c 0.201 0.634 0.100 .752 
Superior honesty × 
Communication 
-2.110 0.922 5.243 .022 
Constant 0.000 .447 0.000 1 
  
Panel B: Logistic regression – Simple effects 
 
Superior honesty is high (Superior honesty = 1) 
Communication -1.910 0.669 8.153 .004 
Residual 0.629 0.438 2.062 .151 
  
Superior honesty is low (Superior honesty = 0) 
Communication 0.201 0.634 0.100 .752 
Residual 0.000 0.447 0.000 1 
  
Supervisory behavioral integrity condition (Communication = 1) 
Superior honesty -1.482 0.676 4.797 .029 
Residual 0.201 0.449 0.199 .655 
  
Supervisory behavioral honesty condition (Communication = 0) 
Superior honesty 0.629 0.676 1.009 .315 
Residual 0.000 0.447 0.000 1 
 
a The likelihood of the subordinate preferring the superior to over-report is measured by the 
frequency that the subordinates select “b” as the response to the following question in the post-
experimental questionnaire: “Which of the following did you prefer happening? a. The division 
manager reports exactly his or her actual performance. b. The division manager reports higher 
than his or her actual performance. c. I was indifferent whether the division manager reports 
exactly or reports higher than his or her actual performance.”  
b Superior honesty is dichotomous. It equals 0 when the supeior over-reports his or her actual 
performance in the decoding task and equals 1 when the superior honestly reports his or her 
actual performance in the decoding task . 
c Communication is dichotomous. It equals 0 for the supervisory behavioral honesty condition 
and equals 1 for the supervisory behavioral integrity condition. In the supervisory behavioral 
integrity condition, the subordinates receive the superior’s communication of the honesty value 
before the performing the capital budgeting task. In the supervisory behavioral honesty 
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condition, the subordinates receive no communication from the superior about the honesty value 
before the capital budgeting task. 
